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PAUL, GAIUS, AND THE 'LAW OF PERSONS': 
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ROMAN LAW IN 
THE EARLY CLASSICAL PERIOD* 
In the seventh chapter of his letter to the Romans, Paul of Tarsus wrote the following 
words: 6 vd40os KVPLEVEL roO dv0p'IrTov 4' 'aov XpovoV . While the apostle Paul 
may seem an unlikely point of departure for a study of Roman jurisprudence, these 
nine words, as I hope to demonstrate, provide invaluable information regarding the 
process by which Roman law was conceptualized and systematized. It is my 
contention that these words, properly interpreted, yield the first occurrence of the 
phrase 'law of persons' as well as the first evidence of a general theory of alieni ius, or 
legal governance by another, in the Western legal tradition. I will begin by examining 
the evidence from Roman legal literature for the origin of the phrase 'law of persons'. 
Then I will turn to Paul's statement, offering a new interpretation and providing an 
account of its connection with Roman law. Finally, I will suggest how this new 
understanding of Paul contributes to the current scholarly discussion on the extent to 
which Roman law was organized into conceptual categories in the early classical 
period.1 
'LAW OF PERSONS' IN ROMAN LAW 
The phrase 'law of persons' first appears in extant Roman legal sources in Gaius' 
four-volume Institutes near the middle of the second century A.D. Following a brief 
preface on the nature of law, and immediately following the famous division of law 
into persons, things, and actions, Gaius identifies his topic for the remainder of 
Volume One as ius personarum.2 While scholars of legal history still debate Gaius' 
role in the creation of the threefold Institutionensystem, which has so fundamentally 
shaped legal traditions in the West, there is no particular reason to believe that he 
coined the phrase ius personarum. In fact, there are several indications he did not. 
First, Gaius uses iuspersonarum without any explanation or introductory remark, a 
sign, perhaps, that his audience was already familiar with the phrase from elsewhere. 
Second, even though Gaius' presentation is divided into the categories persons, things, 
and actions, he has no corresponding term for 'law of things' or 'law of actions'. This 
is particularly noticeable at the beginning of Book 2, where he makes the transition 
* H. D. Betz gewidmet. 
The following books are cited more than twice in this study and will be referred to in 
abbreviated form: C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the 
Romans, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1975-9); J. A. Fitzmyer, Romans (Garden City, NY, 1993); Manfred 
Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch (G6ttingen, 1960); F Stanley Jones, 'Freiheit' in den 
Briefen des Apostels Paulus (G6ttingen, 1987); Detlef Liebs, 'Rechtsschulen und Rechtsunterricht 
im Prinzipat', ANRW 2.15 (1976), 197-286; Peter Stein, 'The development of the institutional 
system', in P. G. Stein and A.D.E. Lewis (edd.), Studies in Justinian's Institutes (London, 1983), 
151-63; Alan Watson, Law Making in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford, 1974); Franz Wieacker, 
Rimische Rechtsgeschichte 1 (Munich, 1988); id., 'iber das Verhiiltnis der r6mischen Fachjuris- 
prudenz zur griechisch-hellenistischen Theorie', lura 20 (1969), 448-77. 
2 Gai. Inst. 1.9; also at 1.48 and 2.1 (see next note). 
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from ius personarum to simple res.3 If Gaius had originated the former expression, we 
would have expected this manner of terminology to continue into his consideration of 
both res and actiones.4 
Third, the organizational structure of the Institutes varies considerably throughout 
the work.5 The section covering iuspersonarum (1.9-200) is more explicit and unified in 
its structure than those covering res (Books 2 and 3) and actiones (Book 4), being 
divided into dichotomies and trichotomies that stand in hierarchical relations to one 
another. The treatment of res, by contrast, consists of three discrete units that are 
introduced and arranged variously. The first unit (2.1-96) begins with several 
fundamental definitions, including the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal 
property and a summa divisio, none of which, however, bear directly on the structure of 
this unit. The discussion then moves, without benefit of any clear transition, to a 
lengthy consideration of the acquisition of individual things, a topic explicitly 
identified only in the transition to the second unit (2.97). Both this and the second unit 
(2.97-3.87), which covers the acquisition of complete holdings, adhere largely to a 
sequential ordering of items, with little hierarchical structure. Obligations (3.88-225), 
on the other hand, begins with a transition that is 'very abrupt and hard', but then 
follows 'an especially clear architecture'.6 A summa divisio begins this unit (3.88), 
arranging the material into two distinct genera (cf. 3.182). Each of these is further 
divided into four genera (3.89, 182), the last genus of the first fourfold division being 
subdivided into four (3.135), the first genus of the second fourfold division being 
subdivided into two (3.183). Lastly, the treatment of actiones in Book 4 arranges items 
into traditional groupings and deals with them sequentially, with no overarching 
schema and little use of hierarchy. 
A widely held explanation for this diversity in organizational structure is that Gaius' 
presentation of private law brings together various patterns of conceptualization that 
go back prior to the Institutes.' Thus his treatment of ius personarum, which displays a 
coherency noticeably more advanced than his treatment of things and actions, may 
have been conceptualized, at least in part, by jurists before Gaius; and if this is true, it 
is a small step to suggest that the name also existed before Gaius. 
Given these indications that ius personarum may not have been coined by Gaius, the 
question arises as to how far back before Gaius we may reasonably postulate its 
existence. My own view, as I will make clear in the next two sections, is that the phrase 
was current at least as early as the mid-first century A.D. For now, however, I would like 
to prepare the way for that argument by reviewing the evidence from late Republican 
and early classical legal literature. 
To begin with, we know that the process of grouping civil laws generatim began in 
the early first century B.C. with the publication of Q. Mucius Scaevola's ius civile. We 
3 Superiore commentario de iure personarum exposuimus; modo uideamus de rebus (cf. 4.1). This 
is an emended text, based on Inst. lust. and Gai. Epitome 2.1 pr. It is the reading proposed by 
G6schen and followed by all subsequent editors. 
4 Gerhard von Beseler, 'Einzelne Stellen', ZRG 46 (1928), 268 even suggested bracketing de 
iure at 1.9 on grounds that it was 'stylistically a foreign element'. 
5 For this and what follows see Fuhrmann, 104-15. 
6 Fuhrmann, 108, n. 1 and 109; cf. Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations (Cape 
Town and Boston, 1990; repr. 1992), 26. 
7 So Fuhrmann, 118, 183-6; H. L. W. Nelson (with M. David), Oberlieferung, Aufbau und Stil 
von Gai Institutiones (Leiden, 1981), 376-8, 381-94; id., review of lus civile in artem redactum by 
H. J. Mette, Mnemosyne 14 (1961), 371; Stein, 154-6; Wieslaw Litewski, review of Gaius noster by 
O. Stanojevi6, ZRG 108 (1991), 463-5; cf. Liebs, 235; Zimmermann (n. 6), 1-26. 
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also know that Mucius' use of genera was taken up and refined by his younger 
contemporary Servius, as well as many prominent lawyers after him, and that Mucius' 
student Cicero advocated the creation of an ars iuris civilis, wherein the entire civil law 
code would be organized hierarchically into categories and subcategories.8 One could 
postulate, therefore, that in this intellectual climate a conceptual principle or generic 
heading such as 'law of persons' might well have arisen. 
Against this, however, we must take into account the prevailing scholarly opinion 
that, overall, Roman jurists made only minimal use of genus as an organizing tool in 
their writings. According to Wieacker, Mucius' genera are of the fourth and fifth level, 
without any possibility for subcategories below them; and likewise, Watson finds no 
use of species in Republican law.9 Moreover, there is no hard evidence that Mucius 
or any lawyer before Gaius created an overview of civil law using broad concepts or 
headings on the order of 'law of persons'. Accordingly, many scholars, perhaps the 
majority, have argued for the originality of Gaius, maintaining that the systemization 
of private law, in any meaningful sense of that word, begins with the Institutes.10 
Yet this objection may skew the evidence, for it focuses only on the upper echelon of 
Roman legal literature. Gaius' Institutes, by contrast, is literature of a very low order: 
a textbook or primer, not for lawyers or even law students, but for students receiving 
formal legal instruction as part of a liberal education." In turn, Gaius' pedagogical 
concerns, which may have included an organized presentation of his subject accessible 
to those outside the legal profession, would not have been shared by prominent legal 
writers such as Mucius, Servius, Alfenus, Sabinus, or Neratius.'2 Moreover, as Frier has 
made clear, Mucius' larger agenda for transforming the legal profession actually 
militated against the use of genera and the creation of a grand system of civil law such 
as Cicero envisioned.'3 Thus, Cicero's efforts to promote an ars iuris civilis should not 
be seen as a failed attempt to extend Mucius' innovation to its natural conclusion in the 
professional legal literature, but as a new direction altogether, aimed at the classroom. 
In light of this, it is at least plausible to postulate that running alongside the 
8 For current research on these issues, see Wieacker (n. 1, 1988) 1.597-638; id. (1969), 463-9; 
Watson, 123-95; Bruce W. Frier, The Rise of the Roman Jurists (Princeton, 1985), 155-71; 
Maximilian Herberger, Dogmatik: Zur Geschichte von Begriff und Methode in Medizin und 
Jurisprudenz (Frankfort, 1981), 46-57; and Stein, 151-4. 
9 Wieacker (1988), 1.634-5; id. (1969), 465-6; and Watson, 183-4, 191-2. Cf. Sen. Ep. 58.8-12, 
where Seneca discusses the use of genus and species as a curiosity. But see also Elizabeth Rawson, 
'The introduction of logical organisation in Roman prose literature', Papers of the British School 
at Rome 46 (1978), 27-9, who attempts to qualify these impressions. 
"0 See especially A. M. Honor6, Gaius (Oxford, 1962), 63-5, and the authors listed in Liebs, 
231, n. 186. 
" Franz Wieacker, 'Griechische Wurzeln des Institutionensystems', ZRG 70 (1953), 102-3; 
Liebs, 235; cf W.W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law (Cambridge, 19633), 60. 
"2 Wieacker (1988), 1.635; id. (1969), 467; cf. Fuhrmann, 187-8; and Watson, 108-9. See also 
Cic. De Or. 1.85-91, where Crassus tates explicitly that the creation of a systematic presentation 
is necessary for outsiders and beginners, but insiders and advanced students have no particular 
need for one. 
" Frier (n. 8), 169: 'concentration on isolated hypothetical cases deters the inherent striving of 
legal science toward systematic dogmatism, by keeping law firmly oriented to concrete legal 
relationships with which doctrine is always obliged to deal. Already in Q. Mucius' writings there 
emerges an avoidance of grand system, an avoidance that will characterize later Roman 
jurisprudence xcept in introductory texts.' See also Herberger (n. 8), 55-76, 106-20; Ferdinando 
Bona, 'L'ideale retorico ciceroniano ed il "ius civile in artem redigere"', Studia et documenta 
historiae t iuris 46 (1980), 333-66; Bruno Schmidlin, 'Horoi, pithana und regulae-Zum Einflul3 der Rhetorik und Dialektik auf die juristische Regelbildung', ANRW 2.15 (1976), 104-5; and 
Rawson (n. 9), 29-31. 
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professional legal literature, in which genus plays such a minor part as an organizing 
feature, there was a more popular, pedagogical tradition which aimed at organizing 
helpful topics of private law under broad conceptual headings or even by genus and 
sub-genus. Indeed, this may have begun in Cicero's day or shortly thereafter, for not 
only does he articulate the plan for this venture, but the rise of jurists about this time 
and their promotion of a 'legal science' began to open up the law to a wider audience, 
providing the demand for such an innovation. And since legal scholarship at this low 
level would have been an oral tradition,14 it is no surprise that it is not documented 
until Gaius, whose Institutes may themselves derive from a student's classroom notes 
rather than deliberate publication by the author. 
To be sure, there is nothing necessary or inevitable about this suggested develop- 
ment. As Honor6 has observed, the oral exposition of law need not give rise to system 
or be dependent on it.15 Nevertheless, I find this hypothesis of a lower-level, oral 
tradition attractive inasmuch as it is able to explain how an advanced systemization of 
the civil code could appear seemingly out of nowhere in the mid-second century A.D., 
without appealing to the genius and originality of an otherwise obscure 'Gaius'. It 
may also provide the most satisfying explanation as to why this singular achievement, 
despite its popularity (as attested by the papyri and its very survival), had no 
discernible impact on the legal profession for more than two and a half centuries after 
its publication.16 
Returning to the phrase ius personarum: if, as I am suggesting, Gaius' work 
belonged to a minor, oral tradition, isolated from the interests of mainstream lawyers, 
then the appearance of this phrase in his Institutes may not mark a dramatic 
development in second-century legal science. Rather, it may be the product of an 
evolving tradition of advanced liberal education." Thus, especially in view of our 
earlier observations about the existence of ius personarum prior to Gaius, it seems not 
at all unreasonable to leave open the possibility that this phrase was used in private law, 
even as early as the first century A.D., to designate either a legal principle or a genus of 
law. With this, let us turn to the evidence provided by Paul's letter to the Romans. 
'LAW OF PERSONS' IN ROMANS 7.1 
By most accounts, Paul's letter to the Romans was written c. A.D. 55-60 from the 
Greek city of Corinth to a Christian community at Rome. In the seventh chapter of 
this letter, in the midst of an explanation of Christian salvation, Paul introduces a 
legal principle, gives an example of how it works, and then applies both the principle 
and the example to his ongoing argument. The verse containing the legal principle 
(7.1) reads: "H dyVOEL^TE, dEEA•o0I, ywLVaKOVULV yap VdOLov AaA, 0"t 0 v0/_Lo' 
KUpLEV•L 
t70 vOpATTrovU e•" 'aov XpOVOV o . Throughout the history of Christian 
14 Liebs, 229-30, 235; cf. Wieacker (1988), 1.616. H. von Arnim, Hierokles ethische 
Elementarlehre (Berlin, 1906), xvi-xvii describes a second-century A.D. Stoic primer on ethics. 
15 T. Honor6, review of Oberlieferung, Aufbau und Stil von Gai Institutiones by H. L. W. Nelson, 
Revue d'Histoire du Droit 58 (1990), 473. 
16 T Honor6, 'Gaius (2)', OCD3, 620 suggests that Gaius' status as a provincial accounts for 
this lack of recognition. Naturally, these explanations are not mutually exclusive. 
17 This also makes intelligible why ius personarum appears prominently in Gaius as the 
organizing head for his first major division of law and then not again until the sixth century in Justinian's Institutes, and there only in passages dependent on Gaius. It was part of an oral 
tradition whose efforts at making the law accessible to a wider audience were given their due by 
the legal establishment only during Justinian's reforms. 
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biblical interpretation this has been consistently translated along these lines: 'Or, do 
you not know, brothers-for I speak to ones who know law-that the law has 
jurisdiction over a person as long as he lives?' Yet, if this is correct, a problem arises 
in the next two verses, for the example that Paul gives does not illustrate this principle. 
In Romans 7.2-3 he writes: 
a7TroO vO o Vot/OV 
T ) av8po'S. xpa ovv vroo-r Tov dav8pos- ioLXaALs XP'I7/LatL L Ec v yE•v-qTrat 
davSp ET pp •C v 8E ci7oOcvn 
a vcrp, E 4A•upa a 
urv&•aw 
o-rov vdtov, rov /CL7 ELvcyr av-r-v /IotXaA(8a yEvotE'vr'v Vspt E-r7pw. 
For the married woman is bound by law to the living husband. But if the husband dies, she is 
released from the law of the husband. Thus, while the husband lives, she will be considered an 
adulteress if she marries another man;18 but if the husband dies, she is free from the law, to the 
end that she is not an adulteress if she marries another man. 
Thus even though 7.2-3 is quite obviously intended to illustrate the legal principle in 
7.1 (as indicated by the introductory ydp), the principle, in this understanding, speaks 
of a person being governed by the law as long as that person lives, while the illus- 
tration speaks of a wife being bound to her husband for as long as her husband lives. 
To put the matter another way, the 'person' in 7.1 does not correspond to any of those 
mentioned in 7.2-3: not the husband, the wife, or the 'other man'. 
This inconsistency has long been recognized, and over the centuries several 
solutions have been offered, none of which is very satisfying. These include an 
allegorical interpretation of the passage in which the law is understood to be the first 
husband, the wife the redeemed self, and so on; several attempts to smooth over or 
ignore the difficulty by focusing attention on Paul's 'overall meaning' or describing 
7.2-3 as a 'corollary' or 'tertium comparationis' to the principle in 7.1; efforts to identify 
different types of analogical thinking used by Paul, such as 'sequential analogy'; and, 
finally, the simple admission that the passage just does not make sense on any level.'9 
Rather than choosing from among these competing solutions, concerning which 
there is no scholarly consensus in sight, I would like to suggest that the problem may be 
solved by translating the legal principle in 7.1 in a different manner. Instead of the 
traditional reading, I propose we translate 0 vd1os KUpLEVEL Trov &vOp-rr7TOVU Ea' JOV 
Xpdvov 
v^, 
as, 'the law of the person has jurisdiction as long as he [the person] lives'. In 
this rendering the verb is taken to be intransitive and its subject is 'the law of the 
person', a phrase that carries a technical ring, as if referring to a specific aspect of a 
legal code.20 This avoids the problem of inconsistency with the next two verses, for the 
law can now be understood as having jurisdiction over others during a person's lifetime. 
That is what 7.2-3 illustrates: the law, now identified expressly as 'the law of the 
husband' (7.2), has jurisdiction over a wife during the husband's lifetime. 
In considering the merits of this interpretation-beyond, that is, its principal merit, 
that it makes sense of the argument in 7.1-3-we may note that it provides an 
explanation for other aspects of this passage beyond what the traditional translation 
can offer. First, it brings into focus the deliberate emphasis that one sees in the phrases 
q i ravspos yUvv- and 70o vd4too 7rot avSpdo in 7.2 in a way that the traditional 
'8 For this idiom see below, n. 36. 
'9 See the discussions in Herbert M. Gale, The Use of Analogy in the Letters of Paul (Philadelphia, 1964), 189-98; Cranfield 1.331-5; Joyce A. Little, 'Paul's use of analogy', Catholic 
Biblical Quarterly (1984), 82-90; Fitzmyer, 454-7; and J. D. Earnshaw, 'Reconsidering Paul's 
marriage analogy in Romans 7.1-4', New Testament Studies (1994), 68-88. 20 For the syntax, see below, especially nn. 31 and 53. 
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interpretation cannot. If Paul's point is simply that the law governs a person only 
during his own lifetime, then not only (as we have said) is the example in 7.2-3 
misconceived, but his description of the wife as 'under a husband' and released from 
'the law of the husband' adds nothing to his argument.21 If, however, he intends to 
show that law can govern others during a person's lifetime, then these phrases fit in 
perfectly, for they underscore the legal limitations imposed on the wife by her 
husband's being alive. We might add that the phrase 'the law of the husband' parallels 
'the law of the person', thereby solidifying the continuity in thought between 7.1 and 
7.2-3, a continuity now based on 'law' rather than, as in the traditional translation, on 
the impossible task of identifying the 'person' in 7.1 with one of the persons in 7.2-3. 
Second, regarding Paul's own style, if this author had wanted to say, 'the law has 
jurisdiction over a person', we should have expected simply dvpdwc'ov, not -rot 
d&vpd`rov. This is because, when Paul uses avOppwrros 
in examples elsewhere to refer to 
'a person', he does so without the article.22 To the extent that this Pauline usage also 
holds true in 7.1, the article before dvOpdonrov is another indication that Paul intended 
this noun as an adnominal genitive dependent on 
' 
vo4pos, not as the genitive object of 
KUpLEVEt. 
Third, my translation explains why Paul introduces the legal principle in 7.1 with the 
words 'for I speak to ones who know law'. In the traditional reading there would seem 
to be no reason for this elaborate introduction (found only here in Paul), for the 
principle that law governs people only during their own lifetimes is common sense. 
Moreover, not only has Paul already begun the verse with an introduction that would 
appear sufficient for this ('Or, do you not know, brothers.. .'23), but he has introduced 
a similar notion without comment earlier in 6.7-14.24 Beyond this, in Galatians 3.15 he 
uses a more complex example involving the ratification and annulment of a person's 
will, introducing it simply as 'common knowledge' (KaTd av Opwrvo AE'yw); and in 
Galatians 4.1-2 he makes reference to inheritance law and the age of majority without 
any explanatory introduction. If, however, we adopt the suggestion that 'the law of the 
person' is a piece of legal jargon, then Paul's elaborate introduction would serve to 
alert his audience to the fact that a certain degree of legal expertise is required to 
appreciate his argument. 
In sum, there seems to be ample reason to reject the traditional understanding of 
Romans 7.1 in favour of the one offered here. When Paul wrote 6 v'Los, KVPEptEEL 70o 
avOpcw"rov, he meant 'the law of the person has jurisdiction .. .', not 'the law has 
jurisdiction over a person'. 
Finally, let me return to my proposal above that 'the law of the person' has a 
technical legal ring to it. This notion is suggested by the distinctiveness, or one might 
21 Indeed, the latter phrase has been fairly mysterious to some biblical scholars. C. K. Barrett, 
A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (New York, 1968), 136 even suggests reading 
70o vdopov in apposition to T70t r vpdo ('of the law, i.e. the husband'), an idea first proposed by 
Origen, Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 13.44-5. 
22 Namely Romans 1.23, 2.9, 3.28, 7.24; 1 Corinthians 2.9, 2.14, 4.1, 6.18, 7.1, 7.26, 11.28; 2 
Corinthians 12.2, 12.4; Galatians 2.6, 2.16, 3.15, 6.1, 6.7; Philippians 2.8; and 1 Thessalonians 
4.8. (These passages exclude Paul's use of AvOpworos with a preposition or other modifiers, which 
are constructions governed by different syntactical conventions.) 1 Corinthians 2.11 might seem 
to be an exception, but the construction 7da roT dvOp60brov is determined by its parallelism with 
Trd& 70o OEo, a factor not relevant to Romans 7.1. 
23 This and variations on it are standard introductory formulae in Paul: Romans 1.13, 6.3, 
11.25; 1 Corinthians 10.1, 12.1; 2 Corinthians 1.8; 1 Thessalonians 4.13. 
24 Namely that death frees one from enslavement to sin, which is the result of law. 
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say awkwardness, of the phrase itself; by its rarity,25 which is often an indication of 
technical jargon; and by Paul's introduction to it, 'for I speak to ones who know law'. 
It is further supported by the words KUptEVEL... .. ' 'OOV XpO'VOV , which are 
interwoven with 6 
v6d1oS... ro. 
. vOp7dirov, for these words have good parallels in a 
wide range of legal materials. The use of KUpLEUw in the sense of 'having legal 
jurisdiction over' is attested from the fourth century B.C. and occurs frequently with this 
meaning in the Hellenistic and Roman periods.26 Sometimes it is paired with adverbs 
of time, like Paul's 10' u'aov Xpdvov 
(,?. 
These include Kr'T ETOS, ES, EW aV,27 and 
dlEXp o70 vv.28 In a papyrus from Tebtunis at the end of the second century B.C., 
moreover, we have a very close parallel: 
... KaL 
" 
rPoalTosEEL8tX7Twv daro -v To avyypawcov XPdVOV KEKptLEUKEVatL TOV YOVELg 
avLjrw V k e crov' 7rEpLt2av XPOVOV. 
... and having demonstrated that from the time of the written contracts their parents had legal 
jurisdiction, as long as they were alive.29 
Not only does this text use an adverb of time practically identical to Paul's,30 but the 
verb 
KVPLEoW,, 
which usually takes an object, is intransitive, as in my proposed 
translation.31 
Beyond this evidence, the legalese of Paul's language in 7.1 is confirmed by the next 
two verses. The same technical awkwardness that I have attributed to 'the law of the 
person' is also palpable in 7.2 in the phrase c- (?VrL 
dovSpI, 
'the living husband'.32 
This is probably the forensic twin of a phrase like 'the deceased husband', as it is one 
of three expressions in 7.1-3 whose function is to specify, for legal purposes, that a 
person is living rather than dead. The other two are 4 ' u'ov Xpdvov 5n in 7.1, whose 
legal provenance we have just discussed, and JZV ror 
o70 
O v3pdS in 7.3, which may well 
be the Greek equivalent of vivo marito, a phrase found in early classical law.33 Both rTc 
5(cV dvTpl and ovroZ roT 70 dvpdo are, moreover, rare expressions, which, as in the 
case of c vodos 70Tovo dvOpdWrov, is another potential sign of jargon.34 
25 Elsewhere only at 2 Samuel 7.19 (LXX); see below. 
26 See Aeschines, In Timarchum 1.35; Hyperides, Epitaphius col. 9, line 5 (Jensen) (= Stob. Flor. 
4.23.35.2); Raphael Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri 
(Warsaw, 1955), 230-2; and Diod. Sic. 1.27.2 (re Egyptian marriage contracts). 
27 PTeb 105.47; POxy 3.910.24-5, 8.1124.6-7. 
28 PTorChoach 11 bis 56; 12 V.19-20 (= UPZ 2.161.56, 162 V.19-20). 
29 PTorChoach 12 IX.15-17 (= UPZ 162 IX.15-17). This is from the Hermias suit over a 
building owned by the Theban Choachytes. 
30 Also found in PTorChoach 11.11, 11 bis 12-13, 12 1.22-23 (= UPZ 2.160.11, 161.12-13, 162 
1.22-3); and PTeb 771.8-9. 
3' The intransitive use of KvpLEUw is uncommon but well documented. Aside from the two 
references in n. 28, see: PEleph 14.22; Polybius 8.18.6, 11.6.3; Philo, Leg. Alleg. 3.220; Cher. 74 (= 
Exodus 15.9); 1 Maccabees 7.8; and Sirach 44.3. See also Sext. Emp. Math. 8.97, which may 
derive from the early Stoa or the Dialectical school, according to Theodor Ebert, Dialektiker und 
friihe Stoiker bei Sextus Empiricus (G6ttingen, 1991), 88, n. 12. 
32 Because of its awkwardness the phrase is almost always glossed as if the participle was 
circumstantial ('while the husband is alive') rather than attributive. 
33 Only in Dig. lust. 24.1.11.3 (= Ulp. Sabinus 32, citing Marcellus); 35.1.61 pr. (= Ulp. Lex 
Julia et Papia 8); and 42.1.23 pr. (= Paulus, Plautius 6). 
34 The first occurs only here; the second is found only here and at Plut. De mul. vir. 257 F 4; and 
Cass. Dio, Hist. Rom. (Xiph. ep.) 93.30 (Dindorf-Steph.). Cf. Philo, De Spec. Leg. 1.105, 129; 
3.27, 30. 
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ROMANS 7.1 AS A REFERENCE TO THE ROMAN LAW OF PERSONS 
Thus far we have argued that the phrase 'law of persons' existed in Roman law before 
Gaius; that Paul used the expression 'the law of the person' in Romans 7.1; and that 
this expression derives from a legal context. We are now in a position to ask 
whether there is any connection between Paul's 6 
vo'•os rToi dvOpcrrov 
and Gaius' ius 
personarum. 
To begin with, we should recognize that most New Testament scholars rule out this 
possibility altogether, contending that vdo'os in 7.1 refers to Mosaic Law, or Torah, 
rather than Roman (or Greek) law. They note that vo4pos usually has this meaning in 
Paul, and that in 7.4-6, where Paul applies the principal of 7.1, vdo'os clearly means 
Torah. In their view, it is unreasonable to think that Paul would move so casually from 
one system of law to another in the space of so few verses.35 
The weakness of this argument is twofold. First, it is dependent on the traditional 
translation of the principle in 7.1, 'the law has jurisdiction over a person as long as he 
lives'. While this principle is not found in the Torah per se, these scholars assume that 
it is of such an obvious and general nature that Paul could easily attribute it to the 
Torah without further ado. Yet not only does this assumption fit poorly with Paul's 
address to his readers as 'ones who know law', which seems to presuppose more than 
just general knowledge (see above), but if, as I have argued, the principle in 7.1 should 
be translated as 'the law of the person has jurisdiction . . .', then its absence from the 
Torah becomes very problematic, for there is nothing obvious about it (and hence 
Paul's illustration of it in 7.2-3). 
Second, the argument overlooks Paul's use of vo'4os in 7.2-3, where it surely means 
something other than Torah. This becomes clear if we compare 7.2-3 to Deuteronomy 
24.1-4 (LXX). In that passage we are told that if a woman is divorced by her husband, 
marries another man (ydv'Trat-t v3ptPL 
drE'p,), 
and then is released from the second 
marriage by divorce or the death of the second husband, she may not remarry the first 
husband. The assumption here is that a woman may lawfully marry a second time 
while her first husband is still alive, an assumption not contradicted elsewhere in the 
Torah. This, however, is the opposite of what Paul claims in Romans 7.2-3, namely 
that a wife is 'bound by law to the living husband', and that 'while the husband lives, 
she will be considered an adulteress if she marries another man' (yE'V-ral dJv8p 
OrE'pcg). Since Paul uses the same Hebrew idiom for marrying as does the Mosaic 
passage, it is quite possible, moreover, that the wording of Romans 7.2-3 is an allusion 
to the Mosaic ruling and was actually formulated in opposition to it.36 
Indeed, the most likely provenance of the tradition in 7.2-3 is not the Torah but 
Jesus' prohibition of divorce as found in the Gospels. Like 7.2-3, Jesus' prohibition 
35 See e.g. Fitzmyer, 455-7 for discussion and references. A notable exception is E. Kiisemann, 
Commentary on Romans (Grand Rapids, 1980), 187. 
36 It is not necessary, of course, to assume that Paul formulated the wording of Romans 7.2-3. 
It may depend on an older tradition, as several Jewish and Christian discussions of divorce 
around this time allude to Deuteronomy 24.1-4 in an attempt to modify or replace it. See 
Matthew 5.31 and Mark 10.4; and John J. Collins, 'Marriage, divorce, and family in Second 
Temple Judaism', in Leo G. Perdue et al. (edd.), Families in Ancient Israel (Louisville, 1997), 
117-18. 
For the meaning of the Hebrew idiom, see its recurrence at 7.4; Cranfield, 1:333, n. 5; and cf. 
Jones, 119, n. 44. To my knowledge, before the third century it is attested outside of the 
Septuagint and Paul only in Philo, who is also commenting on Deuteronomy 24.1-4 (De Spec. 
Leg. 3.30). 
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also characterizes a wife's remarriage as an act of 'adultery' and is presented as a 
corrective to Deuteronomy 24.1-4.37 That Paul was familiar with some form of this 
tradition is confirmed by 1 Corinthians 7, where he even seems to elevate it to the 
status of a 'commandment of God' (vTroA3) 0Eot3) over against the Mosaic command- 
ments.38 Thus, despite its popularity among New Testament scholars, there is no 
validity to the notion that vodLos in 7.1 must refer to the Torah simply because the word 
has this meaning in 7.4-6, for already in 7.2-3, which provides the illustration for the 
principle in 7.1, Paul uses vodos- three times with a decidedly non-Mosaic meaning.39 
Returning to 6 vdoLos- 70ro avOpdrrov and its possible connection to ius personarum, 
it would appear that Roman law is the best candidate for the source of Paul's words. 
While Paul knew Torah and may have been acquainted with certain features of Greek 
law, and while both Jewish and Greek traditions developed private law pertaining to 
persons, there is no evidence that these traditions ever systematized private law or 
developed broad conceptual categories.40 There is not even a Hebrew equivalent for 
' 
vo4os o70 &vOpconrov; and outside of Romans 7.1 it occurs in Greek only in the 
Septuagint translation of 2 Samuel 7.19, where it refers to God's 'will for the people' or 
'purpose for humanity', not a legal system.41 By contrast, 6 vdo'os 7ro0~ av6pdnov 
would be a logical way to render ius personarum into Greek, especially given that the 
more literal translation, 6 vdtosg rcv dvOpdv7Trv, was already in use by Greek writers 
as a way to refer to 'human law' over against 'divine will'. 
Apart from iuspersonarum being the only legal term from these three traditions that 
might correspond to Paul's phrase, it suggests itself as the Latin counterpart to 6 vdt-os- 
70ro dvO6porov in another important way as well. As several scholars have remarked, 
under iuspersonarum Gaius understands not rights and duties of persons, but the rules 
governing how a person attains and loses various positions of status in Roman 
society.42 In fact, ius often means 'legal position' or 'authority' in Gaius, and thus ius 
personarum could be fairly translated as 'the legal position of persons'.43 Paul, by 
37 Matthew 5.31; Mark 10.4. 
38 See 1 Corinthians 7.10-11, 19, and my discussion in Paul on Marriage and Celibacy 
(Cambridge, 1995), 169-73. 
39 Another possibility, favoured by a few scholars, is that Romans 7.2-3 is dependent on 
extra-canonical 'Jewish law' from this period, as practised in the synagogue and later codified in 
the Mishnah around A.D. 200. These scholars contend that the distinctive legal feature of Romans 
7.2-3 that earmarks it as 'Jewish law' is that it denies a wife the right to divorce, a stipulation 
found in Josephus and the Mishnah but not in Greek or Roman law. See e.g. James D. G. Dunn, 
Romans (Dallas, 1988), 359-60, 368. The problem with this is threefold. First, outside the Torah 
there is no normative body of Jewish law in the first century A.D. such that Paul could make 
reference to it in passing and expect his audience in Rome, most of whom he had never met, to 
recognize the reference. Especially on the issue of a wife's right to divorce, there may have been a 
number of legal views-see Collins (n. 36), 119-21; and David Instone Brewer, 'Jewish women 
divorcing their husbands in early Judaism', Harvard Theological Review 92 (1999), 349-57. 
Second, it is not at all clear why Paul would prefer a synagogue tradition to a widely disseminated 
teaching of Jesus on the same topic. And finally, a wife's right to divorce does not appear to be the 
defining issue in 7.2-3, but rather the indissolubility of marriage until her husband's death (see 
esp. verse 3). As this appears to exclude the husband's right to divorce as well, the closest parallel 
is with the Jesus tradition, as I have argued above-see also P. J. Tomson, Paul and the Jewish Law 
(Assen and Minneapolis, 1990), 111, 120-1. 
40 For Jewish law, see Boaz Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law (New York, 1966), 1.126. 
41 The underlying Hebrew is corrupt. 
42 Stein, 158; Buckland (n. 11), 58-9; H. E Jolowicz, Roman Foundations of Modern Law 
(Oxford, 1957), 66-9; A. M. Prichard, Leage's Roman Private Law (London and New York, 
1961), 63. 
43 Wieacker (1988), 1.270-1, 491-3; Stein, 161; id., 'The fate of the institutional system', in The 
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comparison, is concerned with an aspect of this same subject, namely the general 
theory of how a person's legal status changes when the legal governance of that person 
by another ends. The apostle illustrates this, as we have seen, with the example of a 
woman who is at first b'tav3pos, 'under a husband's (legal) authority', but then is 
relinquished from 6 vo'tos -roi dv8pdo, 'the law (legal authority?) of the husband', by 
his death. In Gaius these matters are addressed in a lengthy discussion of persons 
'subject to another's authority' (alieni iuris), which is the second major division of the 
ius personarum (1.48-123), and in a discussion of the ways in which those in another's 
authority are freed from it (quo modo ii qui alieno iuri subiecti sunt eo iure liberentur, 
1.124ff.). The first way Gaius mentions is death, as in Paul, followed by loss of 
citizenship, which is the legal equivalent of death (1.127-9).44 
In all, there seems to be sufficient correspondence between Paul's 'the law of the 
person' and Gaius' 'law of persons' to conclude that they both have reference to the 
same nexus of ideas in Roman law, albeit at different stages in the development of this 
nexus. What Paul knows as a principle of law Gaius knows as a formulation that lies 
somewhere between a principle and the designation of one of three divisions of civil 
law. 
As for the supposed problem with Paul's varied use of vdo'os in 7.1-6-Roman legal 
principle (1), Christian prohibition (2-3), and Mosaic law (4-6)-I would argue that 
this is comprehensible inasmuch as Paul is attempting to demonstrate the legal 
abrogation of one system of law (Mosaic law) by setting it in another, larger legal 
framework. Beginning with the principle 'the law of the person', which he and his con- 
temporaries may have understood as a universal principle of law rather than an 
exclusively 'Roman' principle, Paul illustrates this principle with a legal pronounce- 
ment attributed to Jesus, and then applies it to the Mosaic law code. I find nothing 
particularly unlikely or extraordinary in this. 
THE LAW OF PERSONS IN CORINTH AROUND A.D. 50 
At this point it remains to ask how Paul might have learned of the Roman law of 
persons. One might speculate that as a Roman citizen Paul received an overview of 
civil law as part of his education. But since Paul was probably born in Tarsus in the 
first two decades of the first century A.D., this would require the existence of 
elementary legal instruction in Tarsus already in the early part of the century. While 
this is not impossible, given our theory of an oral pedagogical tradition and given the 
moderate educational resources in Tarsus at this time, it is nevertheless highly 
speculative.45 
A more promising hypothesis, which does not necessarily exclude the first, is that 
Character and Influence of the Roman Civil Law (London and Ronceverte, 1988), 74. This fact 
may help in explaining why Gaius has no corresponding 'law of things' or 'law of actions'. 
4 Admittedly, his discussion here pertains to persons in postestate parentis; but according to 
the likely reconstruction of a badly damaged passage, Gaius holds that the situation is the same 
for wives under the power of husbands (137-137a). 
45 For education in Tarsus, see Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, Paul (Oxford, 1996), 34-5. It should 
also be taken into account that our one source which identifies Paul as a Roman citizen also 
indicates that he took his advanced studies not in Tarsus but Jerusalem (Acts 16.37-8, 22.3), an 
altogether unlikely setting for instruction in Roman jurisprudence. The reliability of this 
information has been questioned by some, however. See e.g. Raymond E. Brown, An Introduction 
to the New Testament (New York, 1997), 423-6; and W Ward Gasque, 'Tarsus', Anchor Bible 
Dictionary 6 (1992), 334. 
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Paul became acquainted with various aspects of Roman law through his contact with 
Roman courts in the provinces. As I have shown elsewhere,46 it is quite likely that Paul's 
congregation in Corinth became involved in a lawsuit over the marital status of one of 
its members. While the details of the case are not always clear, it seems that following 
the death of his father a man had married or taken up sexual relations with his 
stepmother. This was seen by some in the congregation as immoral, and since the man 
would not change his ways they took him to court. They lost their case, however, and 
so the matter was left unresolved by the court decision, at least as far as the losing 
side-and Paul-were concerned. Thus in 1 Corinthians, written around A.D. 55, Paul 
steps in to arbitrate the case himself, on moral rather than legal grounds. 
We do not know why the court ruled in favour of the immoral man (or maybe 
simply refused to hear the case), or even if it was a Roman court. But if it was a Roman 
provincial court,47 and the charge against the man was adultery or incest-all of which 
is well within the bounds of current scholarly opinion-then he might have exonerated 
himself by arguing that, as his father was no longer alive, his stepmother was no longer 
his mother in any legal sense.48 In other words, the potestas or ius of his father over his 
stepmother had ended with his father's death. Thus, the principle that Paul recites in 
Romans 7.1, 'the law of the person has jurisdiction as long as he lives', may have been 
something he learned through his efforts at sorting out this controversy. 
While there are a fair number of 'ifs' in this hypothesis, the derivation of Paul's 
knowledge of 'the law of the person' from the Corinthian situation seems to explain 
why, in Romans 7.2-3, he illustrates the principle with an example concerning 
remarriage, even though this example fits poorly with his application of the principle 
in 7.4-6.49 Further, a Corinthian origin gains considerable support from yet another 
text in 1 Corinthians. This is 7.39, where Paul gives his advice on the remarriage of a 
widow: 
FUvv' &'ESaL t1' Oov Xpo'vov t 
6 Jv~p a'vr-js avd- v q 'so-laOv U hrp, E'AEvOE'pa Eui-ieV 
, 1EAEL tcyauqI7vaL, /LOvov V KUptp. 
A woman is bound as long as her husband lives. But if the husband dies, she is free to be 
married to whom she wants, only in the Lord. 
Like Romans 7.1-3, this passage contains legal jargon, namely AEuOdEpa E rtv C 
OEAEt yaleqO-vat, which is a standard element in divorce documents,50 and EW' "aov 
Xpdvov, which we have seen in the papyri. It also has word-for-word parallels to the 
Romans text. Thus yuvv7 SE'Erat and E ' 8ov Xpdvov 
•, 
are common to both 




rt'v in 1 Corinthians differs by 
only one word from the dv 8v d8EroOd&v' JdvIp, 
,UVOE'pa oTl'v 
in Romans. Since 
Romans elsewhere shows a pattern of Paul using phrases and ideas from the 
46 Will Deming, 'The unity of 1 Corinthians 5-6', Journal of Biblical Literature 115 (1996), 
289-312. 
47 A provincial setting would explain the presence in Romans 7.1-3 of parallels to Greek law 
(see above). Further, according to Acts 18.12-17, Paul had had dealings with the Roman court in 
Corinth previous to this. 
48 This would not have been a good defence in Gaius' day, of course (Inst. 1.59, 63), but see the 
report in Philo, Legat. 71-2. 
49 On the logical inconsistency of Paul's argument in 7.2-6, see Kaisemann (n. 35), 190; Jones, 
119; and Fitzmyer, 455. 
50 For example P. W. Pestman, Marriage and Matrimonial Property in Ancient Egypt (Leiden, 
1961), 73-4, 181. 
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Corinthian situation as the basis for examples and paraenetic material,51 the simplest 
explanation for this correspondence is that Romans 7.1-3 derives from Paul's 
experiences in Corinth.52 
In an attempt to tie together these observations, let me suggest the following 
scenario. In sorting out the aftermath of a lawsuit between members of his Corinthian 
church, Paul inquires into aspects of Roman law relevant to the case, including a 
principle known as 'the law of the person'. This was a principle current among 
solicitors and legal advisors practising law at a fairly low level, having been developed 
in the context of elementary legal studies, and may have been familiar to Paul through 
his own education. Paul has opportunity to use this knowledge in both 1 Corinthians 
7.39 and Romans 7.1-3. The main difference between these passages is that in Romans 
he underscores the technical nature of his knowledge with such phrases as 'I speak to 
ones who know law', 'the law of the person', 'bound by law', 'the living husband', 
'released from the law of the husband', and 'freefrom the law'. He does this because he 
sees a rhetorical advantage in complimenting his Roman audience as 'ones who know 
law' and then employing legal jargon that might impress them and lend weight to his 
argument. He is, moreover, particularly interested in showcasing the clause 'the law of 
the person has jurisdiction as long as he lives'53 because it brings together, in an 
authoritative formulation, key notions of his discussion in chapters 6 and 7 (namely 
KUpLEUWo, 
vo•Los, 
and death).54 In this manner he capitalizes on a legal phrase that 
focuses and advances his theological argument.55 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing study has inquired into the origins of the phrase ius personarum, which 
first appears in Gaius' Institutes in the mid-second century A.D. I have shown on 
grounds both internal and external to the Institutes that this phrase may have existed 
before Gaius; that the Christian writer Paul used a similar phrase in Greek in his 
letter to the Romans; and that there is good reason to suppose that both have 
reference to the same basic entity within Roman civil law. Finally, I have put forth a 
hypothesis that explains how Paul came to know of this phrase. I have postulated that 
he became familiar with it through his involvement in a lawsuit between members of 
his Corinthian church, as documented in 1 Corinthians 5-7. 
I conclude from this that the phrase ius personarum was used in Roman law, at least 
in classroom instruction, as far back as the mid-first century A.D., and possibly earlier. 
If Paul was familiar with it through his congregation's involvement with a provincial 
court around A.D. 55, and he wrote to Christians in Rome, which he had never visited, 
expecting that a reference to this phrase in Greek would add weight to his argument 
among 'ones who know law', then it is logical to suppose that the phrase had acquired 
5' For example Cranfield, 2.691-3. 
52 Cf. the analysis in Jones, 119-20, 121. 
53 Both by his pointed introduction and by the emphatic separation of 
, 
vo'tosc from 7ro 
dvOpdw'rov. This separation also moves 70o dv-Op'rnov closer to the end of the sentence, thereby 
clarifying the subject of . The alternative, which is not pretty, would be 6 vdoos 70rov dvOpdrov 
KUPLEVEL E' O0OV xp VOV 0 . 
54 KUpLEtO occurs in 6.9, 14; vd'los occurs in 6.14, 15 and throughout ch. 7; and death is a theme in 6.1-11, 23, and most of ch. 7. 
" Paul's citation of Mosaic law (Deuteronomy 27.26) in Galatians 3.10 functions in a similar 
way, bringing together the concepts of 'law' and 'curse' in an authoritative legal formulation. See 
E. P. Sanders, Paul (Oxford, 1991), 57-8. 
This content downloaded from 64.251.254.77 on Tue, 29 Oct 2013 15:29:55 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
230 w. DEMING 
a wide currency by this time. Perhaps it had already achieved an authoritative standing 
in some of the more humble circles of legal education. From this we could infer that its 
origins lie somewhere in the first half of the first century A.D. Alternatively, it may have 
only recently become a subject of discussion. In this case we could understand Romans 
7.1 as a reference to one of the latest advances in legal pedagogy, and we could locate 
the origins of iuspersonarum toward the middle of the first century. 
To the extent that this conclusion seems reasonable, it holds important implications 
for the history of the conceptualization of Roman law, and perhaps also for the 
development of the Institutionensystem. By comparing Paul and Gaius we have deter- 
mined that a principle entitled iuspersonarum/6 vdtos 70rol vOpthrrov 
existed at least a 
century before its appearance in the Institutes. Moreover, it was used at that time to 
conceptualize the logic of private laws-potentially a broad range of these laws-that 
pertained to the legal status of one person during another's lifetime. Thus, there is 
evidence that elements of the civil code were being systematized by means of legal 
principles already in early classical law. When iuspersonarum finally surfaces in Gaius, 
this tendency is even more pronounced. Here the phrase stands somewhere between a 
principle and a category of law, a situation made possible by the ambiguity of ius in 
Gaius' day. Thus Gaius uses ius personarum in the same way he uses the simpler 
designations res and actiones, as titles for the three divisions of civil law. 
At minimum, this reading of the evidence raises questions about the pace at which 
the systemization of law took place between these two points, Paul and Gaius, and 
hence also about Gaius' own creativity and contribution to the process. In the face of 
such questions, it will be more difficult for scholars to defend the view that Gaius' 
systemization of Roman civil law was entirely original. In turn, those holding the more 
cautious view, that the Institutionensystem was the creation of 'Gaius or an unknown 
predecessor',56 will find it incumbent upon them to explore more explicitly the pos- 
sibility that this predecessor belonged not to Gaius' century but to the one before. 
The University of Portland WILL DEMING 
deming@up.edu 
56 For example Wieacker (1969), 466-7, 477. 
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